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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 8, 1987

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1110
FED10-01
FG006-01



MEMORANDUM FOR THOMAS C. GRISCOM

FROM: ARTHUR B. CULVAHOUSE, JR. *ABC*
COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Request for Inspection -- Financial
Disclosure Statement -- Form SF 278

We have received a request from the following person to inspect and obtain a copy of your Financial Disclosure Statement:

Terence Hunt
AP
2021 K Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.

Since this request satisfies the requirements of 5 U.S.C. App. § 205(b)(2), we have made your Financial Disclosure Statement available to the requesting individual.

FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE REPORTS

Request of Terence Hunt/Associated Press dated 5/15/87

1. Howard Baker/attached
2. Ronald Reagan/to be distributed week of 5/18/87 through the Press Office
3. George Bush/~~review not complete~~ available through the Office of Government Ethics
4. Thomas C. Griscom/~~review not complete~~ attached
5. Kenneth Duberstein/~~review not complete~~ attached
6. Rhett Dawson/attached
7. A.B. Culvahouse/attached
8. Frank Carlucci/attached
9. Marlin Fitzwater/attached
10. Gary Bauer/attached
11. Frank Donatelli/~~review not complete~~ complete 5/26/87
12. Kenneth Cribb/attached
13. David Chew/attached
14. Nancy Risque/attached
15. Mari Maseng/attached
16. Anthony Dolan/~~review not complete~~ attached
17. Frederick J. Ryan, Jr./attached
18. William Ball/attached

20519
5/21
5/22
5/26
5/28
6/1
6/2


REQUEST TO INSPECT OR RECEIVE COPIES OF SF 278, FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE REPORT

I. APPLICATION

1. Applicant's name and address: TERENCE HUNT AP-WHITE HOUSE OR 2021 K-NW WASH DC	2. Date: 5-15-87 3. Occupation: JOURNALIST
---	---

4. If application is for or on behalf of any other person or organization give the other's name:	4a. Address of the other person or organization:
--	--

5. Public Financial Disclosure Form SF 278 requested for the following named individuals:	
a. HOWARD BAKER	d. THOMAS C. GRISCOM
b. Ronald Reagan	e. Kenneth Duberstein
c. George Bush	f. Rhett Dawson

6. Applicant's signature:


II. NOTICE OF ACTION

- The Statements you requested are enclosed. See the IMPORTANT NOTICE below.
- Your request does not comply with the requirements of the statute. Please complete Part I of this form and return so we may comply with your request.
- Other **See attached list**

The law requires that a report not be available to any person except upon written application by such person stating his or her name, occupation and address, and the name and address of any other person or organization on whose behalf the report is requested, and that the person be aware of the prohibitions on improper use, set forth below.

IMPORTANT NOTICE

- Section 205 of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 provides in part that it is unlawful for any person to obtain or use a report —
- a. for any unlawful purpose;
 - b. for any commercial purpose, other than by news and communications media for dissemination to the general public.
 - c. for determining or establishing the credit rating of any individual; or
 - d. for use, directly or indirectly, in the solicitation of money for any political, charitable, or other purpose.

The Attorney General may bring a civil action against any person who obtains or uses a report for any such prohibited purpose as set forth above. The court may assess against such a person a penalty in any amount not to exceed \$5,000. Such remedy shall be in addition to any other remedy available under statutory or common law.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

The Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Public Law 95-521 as amended, authorizes the solicitation of the information requested in this form. Failure to furnish the information will result in this agency's inability to allow access to, or to provide copies of, the financial disclosure forms requested. Otherwise, furnishing the requested information is voluntary. The information may be publicly disclosed pursuant to section 205 (b) of the Act, or as otherwise authorized by law.

REQUEST TO INSPECT OR RECEIVE COPIES OF SF 278, FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE REPORT

I. APPLICATION

1. Applicant's name and address: TERENCE HUNT AP-WHITE HOUSE OR 2021 K NW WASH DC 20006	2. Date: 5-15-87
	3. Occupation: Journalist

4. If application is for or on behalf of any other person or organization give the other's name:	4a. Address of the other person or organization:

5. Public Financial Disclosure Form SF 278 requested for the following named individuals:	
a. A. B. CULVAHOUSE	d. GARY BAUER
b. FRANK CARLUCCI	e. FRANK DONATELLI
c. MARLIN FITZWATER	f. KENNETH CRIBB

6. Applicant's signature:

Terence Hunt

II. NOTICE OF ACTION

The Statements you requested are enclosed. See the IMPORTANT NOTICE below.

Your request does not comply with the requirements of the statute. Please complete Part I of this form and return so we may comply with your request.

Other *All attached list*

The law requires that a report not be available to any person except upon written application by such person stating his or her name, occupation and address, and the name and address of any other person or organization on whose behalf the report is requested, and that the person be aware of the prohibitions on improper use, set forth below.

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
REQUEST TO INSPECT OR RECEIVE COPIES OF SF 278, FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE REPORT

I. APPLICATION

1. Applicant's name and address: TERENCE HUNT AP - White House OR 2021 K-NW WASH, DC 20006	2. Date: 5-15-87
	3. Occupation: Journalist

4. If application is for or on behalf of any other person or organization give the other's name:	4a. Address of the other person or organization:

5. Public Financial Disclosure Form SF 278 requested for the following named individuals:	
a. DAVID Chew	d. Anthony Dolan
b. Nancy Risque	e. Frederick J. Ryan Jr.
c. MARI MASENG	f. William Ball

6. Applicant's signature:


II. NOTICE OF ACTION

- The Statements you requested are enclosed. See the IMPORTANT NOTICE below.
- Your request does not comply with the requirements of the statute. Please complete Part I of this form and return so we may comply with your request.
- Other **see attached list**

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**WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET**

Peter

- O - OUTGOING
- H - INTERNAL
- I - INCOMING
Date Correspondence Received (YY/MM/DD) 1/1

Name of Correspondent: Lee R. Graham

MI Mail Report User Codes: (A) _____ (B) _____ (C) _____

Subject: FOIA request

ROUTE TO:	ACTION	DISPOSITION			
Office/Agency (Staff Name)	Action Code	Tracking Date YY/MM/DD	Type of Response	Code	Completion Date YY/MM/DD
<u>culhall</u>	ORIGINATOR	<u>87,12,07</u>	<u>PY</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>88,01,25</u>
	Referral Note:	<u>for JBS</u>			
<u>cust 31</u>	<u>D</u>	<u>87,12,08</u>	<u>PY</u>	<u>NAN</u>	<u>88,01,25</u>
	Referral Note:	<u>Jan 25 88 PDK memo for the file</u>			
	Referral Note:				
	Referral Note:				
	Referral Note:				

- ACTION CODES:**
- A - Appropriate Action
 - C - Comment/Recommendation
 - D - Draft Response
 - F - Furnish Fact Sheet to be used as Enclosure
 - I - Info Copy Only/No Action Necessary
 - R - Direct Reply w/Copy
 - S - For Signature
 - X - Interim Reply
- DISPOSITION CODES:**
- A - Answered
 - B - Non-Special Referral
 - C - Completed
 - S - Suspended

FOR OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE:
 Type of Response = Initials of Signer
 Code = "A"
 Completion Date = Date of Outgoing

Comments: Continuing Correspondence

Keep this worksheet attached to the original incoming letter.
 Send all routing updates to Central Reference (Room 75, OEOb).
 Always return completed correspondence record to Central Files.
 Refer questions about the correspondence tracking system to Central Reference, ext. 2590.

RECORDS MANAGEMENT ONLY

CLASSIFICATION SECTION

No. of Additional Correspondents: _____ Media: L Individual Codes: 4000 _____

Prime Subject Code: FE 010-01 Secondary Subject Codes: _____

PRESIDENTIAL REPLY

Code	Date	Comment	Form
C	_____	Time: _____	P- _____
DSP	_____	Time: _____	Media: _____

SIGNATURE CODES:

- CPn - Presidential Correspondence
 - n - 0 - Unknown
 - n - 1 - Ronald Wilson Reagan
 - n - 2 - Ronald Reagan
 - n - 3 - Ron
 - n - 4 - Dutch
 - n - 5 - Ron Reagan
 - n - 6 - Ronald
 - n - 7 - Ronnie

- CLn - First Lady's Correspondence
 - n - 0 - Unknown
 - n - 1 - Nancy Reagan
 - n - 2 - Nancy
 - n - 3 - Mrs. Ronald Reagan

- CBn - Presidential & First Lady's Correspondence
 - n - 1 - Ronald Reagan - Nancy Reagan
 - n - 2 - Ron - Nancy

MEDIA CODES:

- B - Box/package
- C - Copy
- D - Official document
- G - Message
- H - Handcarried
- L - Letter
- M - Mailgram
- O - Memo
- P - Photo
- R - Report
- S - Sealed
- T - Telegram
- V - Telephone
- X - Miscellaneous
- Y - Study

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 25, 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR JAY B. STEPHENS

FROM: PETER D. KEISLER *PK*

SUBJECT: Continuing Correspondence from Mr. Lee M. Graham

Mr. Lee Graham is the continuing correspondent who is seeking "authentication" of several documents which are in his possession. These documents purport to be government records dealing with the discovery of extraterrestrial life. You have sent him two letters thus far. In your letter of November 27, 1987, you declined his Freedom of Information Act request to the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. In your letter of January 11, 1988, you declined his Freedom of Information Act request to the White House. In the January 11 letter, you further indicated that the White House does not "authenticate" records upon private request, and suggested that he contact other government agencies or repositories of government documents if he wishes to pursue his inquiry.

noted
PK

In the attached letter, dated December 1, 1987, Mr. Graham requests that we inform him which agency he should contact in order to make a Freedom of Information Act request for complete copies of the documents in his possession. I believe your letter of January 11 answers this inquiry to the appropriate extent. I have attached a copy of that letter for your reference. In my judgment, that letter suffices as a response to Mr. Graham's most recent correspondence, and therefore no further action is required.

Attachment

JBS/PDK:jck
JBStephens
PDKeisler ✓
Chron.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

JAN 11 1988

Dear Mr. Graham:

This is in response to your Freedom of Information Act request to Peter Keisler, Associate Counsel to the President.

As I explained in my letter to you dated November 23, 1987, the White House, as an entity whose "sole function is to advise and assist the President," is not an "agency" subject to the Freedom of Information Act. Kissinger v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136, 156 (1980). Accordingly, we respectfully decline to comply with your request.

Moreover, the White House is not in a position to "authenticate" upon private request documents which purport to be governmental records. The White House records of prior Administrations are stored at private libraries or at the National Archives and Records Administration. Other departments and agencies of the government are responsible for the storage of their own historical documents. I suggest that you contact those repositories if you wish to pursue your inquiry.

Sincerely,

J.B.S.

Jay B. Stephens
Deputy Counsel to the President

Mr. Lee M. Graham
526 W. Maple
Monrovia, CA 91016

517937C4

1 December 1987
JAY B. STEPHENS
Deputy Counsel to the President
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. Stephens:

Thank you Sir for responding (see enclosure A) to my letter of request (FOIA) for an authenticated/unclassified copy of this document (see enclosure B5 thru B11).

While you did not provide me with an authenticated/unclassified copy of the requested document; by responding in the manner that you have; you have implied that this document (see enclosure B5 thru B11) is genuine; i. e., if you are obeying the DoD Directive 5200.1-R and the Executive Order #12356 (see enclosure C1 thru C4 and D1 thru D9 respectively).


Please note that I am attempting to obey the DoD Directive 5200.1-R (see enclosure C2 Sec. 6-102 b) as I am led to understand same. I have thus submitted this document (see enclosure B5 thru B11) to you for your perusal. If this document is not genuine or has not been properly unclassified; I trust that you will inform me of the fact.

I have already made numerous FOIA requests to other Government agencies as to the authenticity of this document (see enclosure B5 thru B11) but have been unable to locate that agency with the primary responsibility that first unclassified the document.

I, therefore, would appreciate it if you would apprise me of that agency to which I should make a FOIA (Freedom of information Act) request for a complete authenticated/unclassified copy of this document (see enclosure B5 thru B11).

Thank you again for your time Sir.

Sincerely


Lee M. Graham
526 W. Maple
Monrovia, CA. 91016

A

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 27, 1987

Dear Mr. Graham:

This letter responds to your Freedom of Information Act request to Anne Armstrong, Chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.


Please be advised that the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board is part of the White House Office. The White House Office is an entity whose "sole function is to advise and assist the President" and, as such, is not an "agency" subject to the Freedom of Information Act. Kissinger v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136, 156 (1980). Accordingly, we respectfully decline to comply with your request. You may wish to submit your request to other government agencies that are subject to the Freedom of Information Act.

Sincerely,



Jay B. Stephens
Deputy Counsel to the President

Mr. Lee M. Graham
526 W. Maple
Monrovia, CA 91016



The Monthly Newsletter
of the
Fair-Witness Project, inc.

4219 W. Olive St., Suite 247 Burbank, CA 91505 (818) 506-8365

Vol. II. No. 8. (12 Pages)

SEPTEMBER 1, 1987 6FWP, Inc

**THE MJ-12 UFO DOCUMENTS:
MAJOR BREAKTHROUGH OR CLEVER HOAX?**

Included in this issue of FOCUS are completely clean, unexpurgated copies of the controversial MJ-12 UFO documents which were released to the press last May 28th. These documents are part of the research properties of William L. Moore, Jaime H. Shandera and Stanton T. Friedman, who have made them available to FOCUS as a courtesy. Both Moore and Friedman are recognized and respected UFOlogists of long standing with solid backgrounds for factual reporting, and both are a part of the Fair-Witness Project. Shandera, who is less known in UFOlogical circles, is a Los Angeles television producer with a background that includes directing a variety of news and documentary shows. Moore and Friedman had been working closely together since 1978. In 1982, with the addition of Shandera, the three teamed up on a research project that would take them further into the bizarre world of government involvement with Unidentified Flying Objects than anyone in the civilian field is known to have ever gone before. During the course of this project, information was obtained from a number of (necessarily anonymous) individuals, all apparently well connected within the governmental military intelligence establishment, which strongly suggests that UFOs are indeed extraterrestrial spacecraft and that certain elements of the U.S. intelligence community continue to maintain a high-level but covert interest in this phenomenon at a time when official position statements assert that there is no government interest whatsoever.

Over the past seven years, the Moore-Shandera-Friedman team, working closely with a number of other associates both in the news media and within the civilian UFO community, has quietly but aggressively pursued contacts, developed sources of information, and carefully researched leads. Numerous interviews were conducted and many days were spent combing through records at the National Archives in Washington D.C. as well as both the Truman and Eisenhower presidential libraries and numerous similar facilities both federal and private. It is

now possible to report that considerable progress has been made.

The alleged Eisenhower briefing document and accompanying "Truman" memorandum arrived in the mail (on a roll of undeveloped 35mm film) in a plain brown wrapper at the residence of Jaime Shandera in December, 1984. A detailed and exhaustive study of every aspect of this document has been under way since then. Although an unqualified endorsement of its authenticity is not possible at this time, no information has surfaced to date which is of sufficient weight to suggest that the documents are anything but the genuine articles. Indeed, one document was uncovered at the National Archives which unquestionably verifies the existence of an "MJ 12" group in 1954 and definitely links both the National Security Council and the President of the United States to it. A copy of this document is also included in this issue.

A number of questions and answers about the contents of these documents follow:

**QUESTIONS & ANSWERS ABOUT
THE MJ-12 UFO DOCUMENTS:**

Q: Is there any other evidence that the U.S. government retrieved a crashed alien craft outside Roswell, New Mexico; July, 1947?

A: Moore & Friedman have since 1978 conducted a very, very extensive research project concerning the so-called Roswell Incident. To date, 92 different people have been located and interviewed about the event, 31 of whom had first-hand involvement. Included are several generals, the base security officer, counter-intelligence corps personnel, the neighbors

CONTINUED ON PAGE 3...



FOCUS is a monthly newsletter, published by the Fair-Witness Project, Inc., a non-profit organization incorporated in Delaware, and registered as a foreign corporation in the state of California.



Publisher: The Fair-Witness Project, Inc.

Editor: Jimmy Ward & W. Moore



Fair-Witness Reporters:

- D. Branch
- S. Friedman
- K. Korff
- N. Magnuson
- B. Moore



LETTERS TO THE EDITOR are welcome and will be run if appropriate. Please address letters to the Project, c/o the address on our masthead.



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... AND DIVIDED WE FALL!

By Jimmy Ward

America the beautiful has become America the cancerous. Long before Irangate, the stock scandals and the religious mud-slinging-- long before the Challenger tragedy, it began. Our prisons have changed from places of punishment for crimes against society to rehabilitation centers for the culturally deprived. Welfare, once aid to those facing hard times, has become a right for citizen and non-citizen alike-- a virtual duty of government for how ever long it is requested by those who do little or nothing to help themselves. American products, once eagerly sought the world over for their top quality and value, have become second rate. America now imports more than she exports. The deluge of scientific and technological discoveries and innovations has slowed. The proud melting pot has become a turgid pool. America, it seems is dving from the insidious disease of complacency!

"Let George do it." "It's not my job." What's in it for me?" These have become American mottos, the underlying motif of American works. Complacency has permeated our society from the highest to the lowest levels. If we expect to retain our position of world leadership, it must be stopped.

Thirty years ago while America sat on her posterior, Russia put up Sputnik. It was a dose of bad medicine, but it galvanized America. We woke up, went to work, and the Space-Race was on. America became number one again-- and suddenly the medicine was no longer effective. Complacency set in again.

Perhaps what is needed once again is a good shot in the tail.

A scratch test to check for reaction was recently made by, of all people, the Russians. They proposed a joint venture-- a Mars landing with a crew of both Americans and Russians on board. And in this spirit of cooperation, they would establish a Russian/American base for exploration and research-- using Russian equipment, of course. So far, no rash has developed. Indeed, the proposal received only passing attention in the press.

The Australians, it seems, are working on another medicine. On February 19, 1987, the Australian Premier, Sir Joh Bjelke-Peterson, announced that \$300,000 would be made available for the study of a proposed international, multi-pad spaceport complex at Cape York in Queensland. Efforts would be made to develop an international marketing program to encourage commercial interest from private, multi-



FOCUS

SEPTEMBER 1, 1987

"Q. & A. ABOUT MJ-12",
Continued:

and family of the rancher who discovered the wrecked device, the public relations officer of the air base, local news media personnel, etc. To date, one book and five research papers have been published presenting the data.

Q: Is there any proof that the event was first publicized and then covered-up by the government?

A: Yes. A press release was first distributed by the Army Air Force at Roswell stating that a crashed disc had been recovered. Then shortly afterwards the head of the 8th Air Force announced that a mistake had been made and that it was only a radar reflector from a weather balloon. The officer who took the call from Washington DC with the instructions to cover-up the story has so testified to Friedan and Moore. Many people who handled the very strange materials have testified that the material could not have been from a radar reflector. Ten first-hand witnesses are on record as having stated that the object was, in fact, some sort of space craft.

Q: Was there any evidence of strange writing on the retrieved material?

A: Yes. Five persons who actually handled pieces of the wreckage have described very unusual symbols on pieces of the wreckage.

Q: Is there any evidence that President-elect Eisenhower received a military briefing on 18 November, 1952?

A: Yes. Information at the Eisenhower Library and in the Truman files indicates White House and Pentagon briefings on that date. A Washington Post article also confirms a briefing on that date.

Q: Is there any evidence that Dr. Bush and Secretary Forrestal met with President Truman on Sept. 24th, 1947?

A: Yes. Forrestal's diary, Bush's files and the Truman Library listing of Presidential activities all establish that Bush and Forrestal first met with each other and then with Truman on that date. Bush and Forrestal often met with each other during the 1947-49 time frame.

Q: Is there any evidence that the Cutler to Twining "Top Secret Restricted" memo is genuine?

A: Yes. There are several factors to be considered here:
A. It was found in a file box at the National Archives by Moore and Shandera who were the first persons to go through the early declassified materials.

B. The archivist Joanna Williamson who was in charge of the RG 341 file is quoted in the London Observer as saying "It was found in the files of the U.S. Air Force's Director of Intelligence and is certainly genuine."

C. A very similar in format and content "Top Secret-Eyes Only" memo was sent by Cutler to Twining in 1953 about a similar NSC meeting on another, unrelated, project.

Q: Why is there no signature on the memo?

A: The file copy was a carbon. Carbons are normally not signed.

Q: Is there any reason at all to think that Harvard astronomer Dr. Donald H. Menzel, who wrote three anti-UFO books and many articles, could really have been part of a Top Secret-Eyes Only group that knew some UFOs were "Identified Alien Craft"?

A: As a result of extended research by Friedan at Harvard and elsewhere, these facts have been established about Dr. Menzel:

A. Menzel once mentioned in a letter written to President-elect Jack Kennedy that he possessed a Top Secret-Ultra security clearance.

B. Menzel claimed to JFK in 1960 that he had a longer continuous association with the highly classified National Security Agency (NSA) and its predecessor U.S. Navy agency than anyone else in the government at that time.

C. Menzel's association with Dr. Vannevar Bush, wartime head of the Office of Scientific Research and Development, dates back to 1934.

D. Bush was the staunchest Menzel defender at a USAF loyalty hearing in 1950. Indeed, Bush had instructed Dr. Menzel's attorney to notify him (Bush) immediately upon resolution of the loyalty problem.

E. Menzel worked on classified programs for more than 30 different companies.

F. Menzel is on record as having made numerous trips during 1947 to both Washington, DC and New Mexico on government research activities.

G. Menzel had learned Japanese for his cryptography work for the Navy, was familiar with disinformation, and would have been the perfect person to show the Roswell writing to.

H. Menzel had written science fiction and popular newspaper articles for major papers. He was the best qualified of the 12 to put out disinformation and his first book was translated into Russian.

Q: The documents indicate that a second object crashed in Texas on the night of December 6th-7th, 1950. Is there any indication that such an event ever occurred?

A: Yes. A copy of an official communique was located in files released by the F.B.I. indicating a "high alert" status about UFOs had been called by the Air Force on December 6th, 1950. There are also several newspaper articles indicating that military leaves at various airbases were abruptly cancelled that same day.



FOCUS

SEPTEMBER 1, 1987

*** BOOK REVIEW ***

"Q. & A. ABOUT MJ-12", Continued:

Q: What about other official documentary evidence?

A: A formerly Top Secret Canadian memo dated November, 1950, states that "the matter (of UFOs) is the most highly classified subject in the United States government" and identified Dr. Vannevar Bush as head of a project which was trying to discover how UFOs work.

Q: Mr. Philip Klass has suggested that Admiral Hillenkoetter was actually serving in the Pacific at the time of the supposed Eisenhower briefing. Is this true?

A: No. The facts are that he had been assigned to Pacific duty in November, 1950, but he returned as commander of the Brooklyn, NY, Naval Base in September, 1951. In June, 1952, he was named Commandant of the U.S. Navy Third District and was based in New York City.

Q: Doesn't it seem strange that General Eisenhower had to be briefed in 1952 on matters about which he surely would have been informed as Army Chief of Staff years earlier?

A: Not at all. The facts are that he accepted the job as President of Columbia University in June, 1947-- before the Roswell Incident and the establishment of Majestic 12. He served until May, 1950, when he began a very difficult job in Europe as Supreme Commander of the NATO forces trying to unify a number of different political and military factions. He remained there until 1952 when he returned to campaign for the presidency. In other words, he had no "need-to-know" during the period July, 1947 through November, 1952. His forte was neither intelligence nor technology.

EDITORIAL: CONTINUED FROM PAGE 2...

national companies and "third world" governments. Japan and China have already shown strong interest, as have some U.S. commercial concerns.

It should be noted here that an irritant has been added to the Australian medicine. The Aussies are not even considering American made rockets. It seems they prefer instead to buy the much more reliable and cheaper Russian Proton. Naturally the Russians have offered to supply them with technicians, labor and trainers as a part of the package.

Shouldn't this be enough for America to once again stand up and take notice? Hopefully we will find some way to drag ourselves out of our nice, warm beds and fight off the complacency that has begun to threaten our very existence. Either "United we Stand"... or else! (JW)

THE COMMON SENSE APPROACH TO GHOSTS, By Robert L. Grudzis (Knowledge Unlimited, 1271 W. Dundee Rd., Suite 14-A, Buffalo Grove, IL, 60089; 1986, 92pp., softbound. ISBN 0-9616045-4-4)

Reviewed for FOCUS by Mr. Dale Kaczaarek, President of the Ghost Research Society, POBX 205, Oaklawn, IL 60454.

I have always said that what students of parapsychology need is an easy to understand, simple to read, information packed book on the subject of ghosts. This book truly fulfills those needs, and a lot more!! Many books written on paranormal subjects are packed with academic terminology and take much too long to get their point across. Not so with this volume, which gets its points across quickly while making interesting reading at the same time.

Unfortunately, even though Ghosts is loaded with very useful information, it isn't long enough. The reader is left wanting more-- a device perhaps deliberately utilized by the author to increase interest in the subject. The book is not filled with impossible case histories, but rather is meant to be a sort of guidebook for amateur and professional ghost hunters alike. Chapters include information about what a ghost is, what they look like, why they make themselves known and how to try to communicate with them. There is also material about poltergeists, different levels of spirits and even a section on what to do if you believe a ghost is bothering you.

Mr. Grudzis is a true professional in his field as well as a practicing psychic. He is a lecturer and a teacher who makes public presentations on a wide variety of New-Age techniques from self-hypnosis meditation to mind dynamics. He is also a former Chairman of the Board of the International Psychic Center, and is a world traveler.

I highly recommend this book to anyone who has even the slightest interest in ghosts and the supernatural. It is a welcome addition to anyone's bookshelf!

COMING UP IN THE OCTOBER 1st ISSUE:

- The Vatican and UFOs.
- How U.S. intelligence agents stole a Russian satellite... in 1959!
- A new book on Perpetual Motion. (Book Review)

The Fair-Witness Project is in constant need of funds with which to continue our work. Tax-deductible contributions are always welcome, and are encouraged at this time. We hope you will help.

The Project recently made a \$160.00 expense reimbursement grant to board member Stanton T. Friedman to assist him in his continuing research on MJ-12 and Donald H. Menzel.

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TOP SECRET / MAJIC
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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

* TOP SECRET *

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BRIEFING DOCUMENT: OPERATION MAJESTIC 12

PREPARED FOR PRESIDENT-ELECT DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER: (EYES ONLY)

18 NOVEMBER, 1952

WARNING: This is a TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY document containing compartmentalized information essential to the national security of the United States. ONLY ACCESS to the material herein is strictly limited to those possessing Majestic-12 clearance level. Reproduction in any form or the taking of written or mechanically transcribed notes is strictly forbidden.

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T52-EXEMPT (B)

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SUBJECT: OPERATION MAJESTIC-12 PRELIMINARY BRIEFING FOR
PRESIDENT-ELECT EISENHOWER.

DOCUMENT PREPARED 18 NOVEMBER, 1952.

BRIEFING OFFICER: ADM. ROSCOE H. HILLENKOETTER (MJ-1)

NOTE: This document has been prepared as a preliminary briefing only. It should be regarded as introductory to a full operations briefing intended to follow.

OPERATION MAJESTIC-12 is a TOP SECRET Research and Development/Intelligence operation responsible directly and only to the President of the United States. Operations of the project are carried out under control of the Majestic-12 (Majic-12) Group which was established by special classified executive order of President Truman on 24 September, 1947, upon recommendation by Dr. Vannevar Bush and Secretary James Forrestal. (See Attachment "A".) Members of the Majestic-12 Group were designated as follows:

- Adm. Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter
- Dr. Vannevar Bush
- Secy. James V. Forrestal*
- Gen. Nathan F. Twining
- Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg
- Dr. Detlev Bronk
- Dr. Jerome Hunsaker
- Mr. Sidney W. Souers
- Mr. Gordon Gray
- Dr. Donald Menzel
- Gen. Robert M. Montague
- Dr. Lloyd V. Berkner

The death of Secretary Forrestal on 22 May, 1949, created a vacancy which remained unfilled until 01 August, 1950, upon which date Gen. Walter B. Smith was designated as permanent replacement.

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TOP SECRET / MAJIC

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T52-EXEMPT (B)

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On 24 June, 1947, a civilian pilot flying over the Cascade Mountains in the State of Washington observed nine flying disc-shaped aircraft traveling in formation at a high rate of speed. Although this was not the first known sighting of such objects, it was the first to gain widespread attention in the public media. Hundreds of reports of sightings of similar objects followed. Many of these came from highly credible military and civilian sources. These reports resulted in independent efforts by several different elements of the military to ascertain the nature and purpose of these objects in the interests of national defense. A number of witnesses were interviewed and there were several unsuccessful attempts to utilize aircraft in efforts to pursue reported discs in flight. Public reaction bordered on near hysteria at times.

In spite of these efforts, little of substance was learned about the objects until a local rancher reported that one had crashed in a remote region of New Mexico located approximately seventy-five miles northwest of Roswell Army Air Base (now Walker Field).

On 07 July, 1947, a secret operation was begun to assure recovery of the wreckage of this object for scientific study. During the course of this operation, aerial reconnaissance discovered that four small human-like beings had apparently ejected from the craft at some point before it exploded. These had fallen to earth about two miles east of the wreckage site. All four were dead and badly decomposed due to action by predators and exposure to the elements during the approximately one week time period which had elapsed before their discovery. A special scientific team took charge of removing these bodies for study. (See Attachment "C".) The wreckage of the craft was also removed to several different locations. (See Attachment "B".) Civilian and military witnesses in the area were debriefed, and news reporters were given the effective cover story that the object had been a misguided weather research balloon.

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A covert analytical effort organized by Gen. Twining and Dr. Bush acting on the direct orders of the President, resulted in a preliminary concensus (19 September, 1947) that the disc was most likely a short range reconnaissance craft. This conclusion was based for the most part on the craft's size and the apparent lack of any identifiable provisioning. (See Attachment "D".) A similar analysis of the four dead occupants was arranged by Dr. Bronk. It was the tentative conclusion of this group (30 November, 1947) that although these creatures are human-like in appearance, the biological and evolutionary processes responsible for their development has apparently been quite different from those observed or postulated in homo-sapiens. Dr. Bronk's team has suggested the term "Extra-terrestrial Biological Entities", or "EBEs", be adopted as the standard term of reference for these creatures until such time as a more definitive designation can be agreed upon.

Since it is virtually certain that these craft do not originate in any country on earth, considerable speculation has centered around what their point of origin might be and how they get here. Mars was and remains a possibility, although some scientists, most notably Dr. Menzel, consider it more likely that we are dealing with beings from another solar system entirely.

Numerous examples of what appear to be a form of writing were found in the wreckage. Efforts to decipher these have remained largely unsuccessful. (See Attachment "E".) Equally unsuccessful have been efforts to determine the method of propulsion or the nature or method of transmission of the power source involved. Research along these lines has been complicated by the complete absence of identifiable wings, propellers, jets, or other conventional methods of propulsion and guidance, as well as a total lack of metallic wiring, vacuum tubes, or similar recognizable electronic components. (See Attachment "F".) It is assumed that the propulsion unit was completely destroyed by the explosion which caused the crash.

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T52-EXEMPT (E)

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TOP SECRET MAJIC

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A need for as much additional information as possible about these craft, their performance characteristics and their purpose led to the undertaking known as U.S. Air Force Project SIGN in December, 1947. In order to preserve security, liason between SIGN and Majestic-12 was limited to two individuals within the Intelligence Division of Air Materiel Command whose role was to pass along certain types of information through channels. SIGN evolved into Project GRUDGE in December, 1948. The operation is currently being conducted under the code name BLUE BOOK, with liason maintained through the Air Force officer who is head of the project.

On 06 December, 1950, a second object, probably of similar origin, impacted the earth at high speed in the El Indio - Guerrero area of the Texas - Mexican border after following a long trajectory through the atmosphere. By the time a search team arrived, what remained of the object had been almost totally incinerated. Such material as could be recovered was transported to the A.E.C. facility at Sandia, New Mexico, for study.

Implications for the National Security are of continuing importance in that the motives and ultimate intentions of these visitors remain completely unknown. In addition, a significant upsurge in the surveillance activity of these craft beginning in May and continuing through the autumn of this year has caused considerable concern that new developments may be imminent. It is for these reasons, as well as the obvious international and technological considerations and the ultimate need to avoid a public panic at all costs, that the Majestic-12 Group remains of the unanimous opinion that imposition of the strictest security precautions should continue without interruption into the new administration. At the same time, contingency plan MJ-1949-04P/78 (Top Secret - Eyes Only) should be held in continued readiness should the need to make a public announcement present itself. (See Attachment "G".)

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ENUMERATION OF ATTACHMENTS:

- *ATTACHMENT "A".....Special Classified Executive Order #092447. (TS/EO)
- *ATTACHMENT "B".....Operation Majestic-12 Status Report #1, Part A. 30 NOV '47. (TS-MAJIC/EO)
- *ATTACHMENT "C".....Operation Majestic-12 Status Report #1, Part B. 30 NOV '47. (TS-MAJIC/EO)
- *ATTACHMENT "D".....Operation Majestic-12 Preliminary Analytical Report. 19 SEP '47. (TS-MAJIC/EO)
- *ATTACHMENT "E".....Operation Majestic-12 Blue Team Report #5. 30 JUN '52. (TS-MAJIC/EO)
- *ATTACHMENT "F".....Operation Majestic-12 Status Report #2. 31 JAN '48. (TS-MAJIC/EO)
- *ATTACHMENT "G".....Operation Majestic-12 Contingency Plan MJ-1949-04P/78: 31 JAN '49. (TS-MAJIC/EO)
- *ATTACHMENT "H".....Operation Majestic-12, Maps and Photographs Polio (Extractions). (TS-MAJIC/EO)

* TOP SECRET *

TOP SECRET - MAJIC

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T52-EXEMPT (E)

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON


September 24, 1947.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Dear Secretary Forrestal:

As per our recent conversation on this matter, you are hereby authorized to proceed with all due speed and caution upon your undertaking. Hereafter this matter shall be referred to only as Operation Majestic Twelve.

It continues to be my feeling that any future considerations relative to the ultimate disposition of this matter should rest solely with the Office of the President following appropriate discussions with yourself, Dr. Bush and the Director of Central Intelligence.



TOP SECRET
EYES ONLY

July 14, 1954

~~TOP SECRET RESTRICTED~~
~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL TWINING

SUBJECT: NSC/MJ-12 Special Studies Project

The President has decided that the MJ-12 SSP briefing should take place during the already scheduled White House meeting of July 16, rather than following it as previously intended. More precise arrangements will be explained to you upon arrival. Please alter your plans accordingly.

Your concurrence in the above change of arrangements is assumed.

ROBERT CUTLER
Special Assistant
to the President

Authority ND 857013
of 12/11/87 DATE 1/12/87

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**INFORMATION
SECURITY
PROGRAM
REGULATION**

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

AUGUST 1982

CHAPTER VI
COMPROMISE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

6-100 Policy

Compromise of classified information presents a threat to the national security. Once a compromise is known to have occurred, the seriousness of damage to U.S. interests must be determined and appropriate measures taken to negate or minimize the adverse effect of such compromise. When possible, action also should be taken to regain custody of the documents or material that were compromised. In all cases, however, appropriate action must be taken to identify the source and reason for the compromise and remedial action taken to ensure further compromises do not occur. The provisions of DoD Instruction 5200.22 and DoD Directive 5210.50 (references (jj) and (kk)) apply to compromises covered by this Chapter.

6-101 Cryptographic Information

The procedures for handling compromises of cryptographic information are set forth in NSA KAG I-D (reference (bb)).

6-102 Responsibility of Discoverer

a. Any person who has knowledge of the actual or possible compromise (as defined in subsection 1-308) of classified information shall immediately report such fact to the security manager of the person's activity (see subsection 13-304).

b. Any person who discovers classified information out of proper control shall take custody of such information and safeguard it in an appropriate manner, and shall notify immediately an appropriate security authority.

6-103 Preliminary Inquiry

A designated responsible official shall initiate a preliminary inquiry to determine the circumstances surrounding the actual or possible compromise. The preliminary inquiry shall establish one of the following:

a. That a compromise of classified information did not occur;

b. That a compromise of classified information did occur but the compromise could not reasonably be expected to cause damage to the national security. If, in such instances, the official finds no indication of significant security weakness, the report of preliminary inquiry will be sufficient to resolve the incident and, when appropriate, support the administrative sanctions under subsection 14-101; or

c. That compromise of classified information did occur and that the probability of damage to the national security cannot be discounted. Upon this determination, the responsible official shall:

1. Report the circumstances of the compromise to an appropriate authority as specified in DoD Component instructions;

2. If the responsible official is the originator, take the action prescribed in subsection 6-106; and

3. If the responsible official is not the originator, notify the originator of the known details of the compromise, including identification of the classified information. If the originator is unknown, notification will be sent to the office specified in DoD Component instructions.

6-104 Investigation

If it is determined that further investigation is warranted, such investigation will include the following:

a. Complete identification of each item of classified information involved;

b. A thorough search for the classified information;

c. Identification of any person or procedure responsible for the compromise. Any person so identified shall be apprised of the nature and circumstances of the compromise and be provided an opportunity to reply to the violation charged. If such person does not choose to make a statement, this fact shall be included in the report of investigation;

d. A statement that compromise of classified information occurred or is probable, and the cause of the loss or compromise; or a statement that compromise did not occur or that there is minimal risk of damage to the national security; and

e. Compilation of the data in paragraphs a. through d., above, in a report to the authority ordering the investigation.

6-105 Responsibility of Authority Ordering Investigation

a. The report of investigation shall be reviewed to ensure compliance with this Regulation and instructions issued by DoD Components.

b. The recommendations contained in the report of investigation shall be reviewed to determine sufficiency of remedial, administrative, disciplinary, or legal action proposed and, if adequate, the report of investigation shall be forwarded with recommendations through supervisory channels. See subsections 14-101 and 14-102.

6-106 Responsibility of Originator

The originator or an official higher in the originator's supervisory chain shall, upon receipt of notification of loss or probable compromise of classified information, take action as prescribed in subsection 2-210.

6-107 Espionage and Deliberate Compromise

Cases of espionage and deliberate unauthorized disclosure of classified information to the public shall be reported in accordance with DoD Instruction 5200.22 and DoD Directive 5210.50 (references (jj) and (kk)) and implementing issuances.

6-108 Unauthorized Absentees

When an individual who has had access to classified information is on unauthorized absence, an inquiry as appropriate under the circumstances, to include consideration of the length of absence and the degree of sensitivity of the classified information involved, shall be conducted to detect if there are any indications of activities, behavior, or associations that may be inimical to the interest of national security. When such indications are detected, a report shall be made to the DoD Component counterintelligence organization.

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U.S. President
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Codification
of

Presidential
Proclamations
and
Executive
Orders

January 20, 1961 — January 20, 1985



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Codification of Presidential Proclamations and Executive Orders

knowledge publicly, and functions in support of such activities, but which are not intended to influence United States political processes, public opinion, policies, or media and do not include diplomatic activities or the collection and production of intelligence or related support functions.

(i) *United States person* means a United States citizen, an alien known by the intelligence agency concerned to be a permanent resident alien, an unincorporated association substantially composed of United States citizens or permanent resident aliens, or a corporation incorporated in the United States, except for a corporation directed and controlled by a foreign government or governments.

3.5 Purpose and Effect. This Order is intended to control and provide direction and guidance to the Intelligence Community. Nothing contained herein or in any procedures promulgated hereunder is intended to confer any substantive or procedural right or privilege on any person or organization.

3.6 Revocation. Executive Order No. 12036 of January 24, 1978, as amended, entitled "United States Intelligence Activities," is revoked.

Executive Order 12334—President's Intelligence Oversight Board

SOURCE: The provisions of Executive Order 12334 of Dec. 4, 1981, appear at 46 FR 59955, 3 CFR, 1981 Comp., p. 216, unless otherwise noted.

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and statutes of the United States of America, and in order to enhance the security of the United States by assuring the legality of activities of the Intelligence Community, it is hereby ordered as follows:

SECTION 1. There is hereby established within the White House Office, Executive Office of the President, the President's Intelligence Oversight Board, which shall be composed of three members. One member, appointed from among the membership of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, shall be designated by the President as Chairman. Members of the Board shall serve at the pleasure of the President and shall be appointed by the President from among trustworthy and distinguished citizens outside the Government who are qualified on the basis of achievement, experience and independence. The Board shall utilize such full-time staff and consultants as authorized by the President.

SEC. 2. The Board shall:

(a) Inform the President of intelligence activities that any member of the Board believes are in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, Executive orders, or Presidential directives;

(b) Forward to the Attorney General reports received concerning intelligence activities that the Board believes may be unlawful;

(c) Review the internal guidelines of each agency within the Intelligence Community concerning the lawfulness of intelligence activities;

(d) Review the practices and procedures of the Inspectors General and General Counsel of the Intelligence Community for discovering and reporting intelligence activities that may be unlawful or contrary to Executive order or Presidential directive; and

(e) Conduct such investigations as the Board deems necessary to carry out its functions under this Order.

Chapter 32—National Defense

SEC. 3. The Board shall, when required by this Order, report directly to the President. The Board shall consider and take appropriate action with respect to matters identified by the Director of Central Intelligence, the Central Intelligence Agency or other agencies of the Intelligence Community. With respect to matters deemed appropriate by the President, the Board shall advise and make appropriate recommendations to the Director of Central Intelligence, the Central Intelligence Agency, and other agencies of the Intelligence Community.

SEC. 4. The heads of departments and agencies of the Intelligence Community shall, to the extent permitted by law, provide the Board with all information necessary to carry out its responsibilities. Inspectors General and General Counsel of the Intelligence Community shall, to the extent permitted by law, report to the Board concerning intelligence activities that they have reason to believe may be unlawful or contrary to Executive order or Presidential directive.

SEC. 5. Information made available to the Board shall be given all necessary security protection in accordance with applicable laws and regulations. Each member of the Board, each member of the Board's staff, and each of the Board's consultants shall execute an agreement never to reveal any classified information obtained by virtue of his or her service with the Board except to the President or to such persons as the President may designate.

SEC. 6. Members of the Board shall serve without compensation, but may receive transportation, expense, and per diem allowances as authorized by law. Staff and consultants to the Board shall receive pay and allowances as authorized by the President.

Executive Order 12356—National security information

SOURCE: The provisions of Executive Order 12356 of Apr. 2, 1982, appear at 47 FR 14874 and 15557, 3 CFR, 1982 Comp., p. 106, unless otherwise noted.

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Codification of Presidential Proclamations and Executive Orders

Chapter 32—National Defense

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This Order prescribes a uniform system for classifying, declassifying, and safeguarding national security information. It recognizes that it is essential that the public be informed concerning the activities of its Government, but that the interests of the United States and its citizens require that certain information concerning the national defense and foreign relations be protected against unauthorized disclosure. Information may not be classified under this Order unless its disclosure reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security.

NOW, by the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and laws of the United States of America, it is hereby ordered as follows:

PART I

Original Classification

SECTION 1.1 Classification Levels.

(a) National security information (hereinafter "classified information") shall be classified at one of the following three levels:

(1) "Top Secret" shall be applied to information, the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security.

(2) "Secret" shall be applied to information, the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause serious damage to the national security.

(3) "Confidential" shall be applied to information, the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security.

(b) Except as otherwise provided by statute, no other terms shall be used to identify classified information.

(c) If there is reasonable doubt about the need to classify information, it shall be safeguarded as if it were classified pending a determination by an original classification authority, who shall make this determination within thirty (30) days. If there is reasonable doubt about the appropriate level of classification, it shall be safeguarded at the higher level of classification pending a determination by an original classification authority, who shall make this determination within thirty (30) days.

SEC. 1.2 Classification Authority.¹

(a) *Top Secret.* The authority to classify information originally as Top Secret may be exercised only by:

- (1) the President;
- (2) agency heads and officials designated by the President in the FEDERAL REGISTER; and
- (3) officials delegated this authority pursuant to Section 1.2(d).

¹ EDITORIAL NOTE: On May 7, 1982, the President issued an order of designation (47 FR 20105, 3 CFR, 1982 Comp., p. 257) the text of which follows:

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 1.2 of Executive Order No. 12356 of April 2, 1982, entitled "National Security Information," I hereby designate the following officials to classify information originally as "Top Secret", "Secret", or "Confidential":

TOP SECRET

Executive Office of the President:

- The Vice President
- The Counsellor to the President
- The Chief of Staff and Assistant to the President
- The Deputy Chief of Staff and Assistant to the President
- The Director, Office of Management and Budget
- The United States Trade Representative
- The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
- The Director, Office of Science and Technology Policy
- The Chairman, The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
- The Chairman, The President's Intelligence Oversight Board

- The Secretary of State
- The Secretary of the Treasury
- The Secretary of Defense
- The Secretary of the Army.
- The Secretary of the Navy
- The Secretary of the Air Force
- The Attorney General
- The Secretary of Energy
- The Chairman, Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- The Director, United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
- The Director of Central Intelligence
- The Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
- The Administrator of General Services
- The Director, Federal Emergency Management Agency

SECRET

Executive Office of the President:

- The Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers
- The President's Personal Representative for Micronesian Status Negotiations
- The Secretary of Commerce
- The Secretary of Transportation
- The Administrator, Agency for International Development
- The Director, International Communication Agency

CONFIDENTIAL

- The President, Export-Import Bank of the United States
 - The President, Overseas Private Investment Corporation
 - The Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency
- Any delegation of this authority shall be in accordance with Section 1.2(d) of the Order.

This Order shall be published in the FEDERAL REGISTER.

(b) **Secret.** The authority to classify information originally as Secret may be exercised only by:

(1) agency heads and officials designated by the President in the FEDERAL REGISTER;

(2) officials with original Top Secret classification authority; and

(3) officials delegated such authority pursuant to Section 1.2(d).

(c) **Confidential.** The authority to classify information originally as Confidential may be exercised only by:

(1) agency heads and officials designated by the President in the FEDERAL REGISTER;

(2) officials with original Top Secret or Secret classification authority; and

(3) officials delegated such authority pursuant to Section 1.2(d).

(d) *Delegation of Original Classification Authority.*

(1) Delegations of original classification authority shall be limited to the minimum required to administer this Order. Agency heads are responsible for ensuring that designated subordinate officials have a demonstrable and continuing need to exercise this authority.

(2) Original Top Secret classification authority may be delegated only by the President; an agency head or official designated pursuant to Section 1.2(a)(2); and the senior official designated under Section 5.3(a)(1),¹ provided that official has been delegated original Top Secret classification authority by the agency head.

(3) Original Secret classification authority may be delegated only by the President; an agency head or official designated pursuant to Sections 1.2(a)(2) and 1.2(b)(1); an official with original Top Secret classification authority; and the senior official designated under Section 5.3(a)(1),¹ provided that official has been delegated original Secret classification authority by the agency head.

(4) Original Confidential classification authority may be delegated only by the President; an agency head or official designated pursuant to Sections 1.2(a)(2), 1.2(b)(1) and 1.2(c)(1); an official with original Top Secret classification authority; and the senior official designated under Section 5.3(a)(1),¹ provided that official has been delegated original classification authority by the agency head.

(5) Each delegation of original classification authority shall be in writing and the authority shall not be redelegated except as provided in this Order. It shall identify the official delegated the authority by name or position title. Delegated classification authority includes the authority to classify information at the level granted and lower levels of classification.

(e) *Exceptional Cases.* When an employee, contractor, licensee, or grantee of an agency that does not have original classification authority originates information believed by that person to require classification, the information shall be protected in a manner consistent with this Order and its implementing directives. The information shall be transmitted promptly as provided under this Order or its implementing directives to the agency that has appropriate subject matter interest and

classification authority with respect to this information. That agency shall decide within thirty (30) days whether to classify this information. If it is not clear which agency has classification responsibility for this information, it shall be sent to the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office. The Director shall determine the agency having primary subject matter interest and forward the information, with appropriate recommendations, to that agency for a classification determination.

SEC. 1.3 *Classification Categories.*

(a) Information shall be considered for classification if it concerns:

(1) military plans, weapons, or operations;

(2) the vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, projects, or plans relating to the national security;

(3) foreign government information;

(4) intelligence activities (including special activities), or intelligence sources or methods;

(5) foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States;

(6) scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to the national security;

(7) United States Government programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities;

(8) cryptology;

(9) a confidential source; or

(10) other categories of information that are related to the national security and that require protection against unauthorized disclosure as determined by the President or by agency heads or other officials who have been delegated original classification authority by the President. Any determination made under this subsection shall be reported promptly to the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office.

(b) Information that is determined to concern one or more of the categories in Section 1.3(a) shall be classified when an original classification authority also determines that its unauthorized disclosure, either by itself or in the context of other information, reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security.

(c) Unauthorized disclosure of foreign government information, the identity of a confidential foreign source, or intelligence sources or methods is presumed to cause damage to the national security.

(d) Information classified in accordance with Section 1.3 shall not be declassified automatically as a result of any unofficial publication or inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure in the United States or abroad of identical or similar information.

SEC. 1.4 *Duration of Classification.*

(a) Information shall be classified as long as required by national security considerations. When it can be determined, a specific date or event for declassification shall be set by the original classification authority at the time the information is originally classified.

(b) Automatic declassification determinations under predecessor orders shall remain valid unless the classification is extended by an authorized official of the originating agency. These extensions may be by individual documents or categories of information. The agency shall be responsible for notifying holders of the information of such extensions.

¹ EDITORIAL NOTE: The correct citation is Section 5.3(a).

² EDITORIAL NOTE: The correct citation is Section 5.3(a).

³ EDITORIAL NOTE: The correct citation is Section 5.3(a).

Classification of Presidential Proclamations and Executive Orders

(c) Information classified under predecessor orders and marked for declassification review shall remain classified until reviewed for declassification under the provisions of this Order.

SEC. 1.5 Identification and Markings.

(a) At the time of original classification, the following information shall be shown on the face of all classified documents, or clearly associated with other forms of classified information in a manner appropriate to the medium involved, unless this information itself would reveal a confidential source or relationship not otherwise evident in the document or information:

- (1) one of the three classification levels defined in Section 1.1;
- (2) the identity of the original classification authority, if other than the person whose name appears as the approving or signing official;
- (3) the agency and office of origin; and
- (4) the date or event for declassification, or the notation "Originating Agency's Determination Required."

(b) Each classified document shall, by marking or other means, indicate which portions are classified, with the applicable classification level, and which portions are not classified. Agency heads may, for good cause, grant and revoke waivers of this requirement for specified classes of documents or information. The Director of the Information Security Oversight Office shall be notified of any waivers.

(c) Marking designations implementing the provisions of this Order, including abbreviations, shall conform to the standards prescribed in implementing directives issued by the Information Security Oversight Office.

(d) Foreign government information shall either retain its original classification or be assigned a United States classification that shall ensure a degree of protection at least equivalent to that required by the entity that furnished the information.

(e) Information assigned a level of classification under predecessor orders shall be considered as classified at that level of classification despite the omission of other required markings. Omitted markings may be inserted on a document by the officials specified in Section 3.1(b).

SEC. 1.6 Limitations on Classification.

(a) In no case shall information be classified in order to conceal violations of law, inefficiency, or administrative error; to prevent embarrassment to a person, organization, or agency; to restrain competition; or to prevent or delay the release of information that does not require protection in the interest of national security.

(b) Basic scientific research information not clearly related to the national security may not be classified.

(c) The President or an agency head or official designated under Sections 1.2(a)(2), 1.2(b)(1), or 1.2(c)(1) may reclassify information previously declassified and disclosed if it is determined in writing that (1) the information requires protection in the interest of national security; and (2) the information may reasonably be recovered. These reclassification actions shall be reported promptly to the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office.

(d) Information may be classified or reclassified after an agency has received a request for it under the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. 552) or the Privacy Act of 1974 (5 U.S.C. 552a), or the manda-

Chapter 32—National Defense

tory review provisions of this Order (Section 3.4) if such classification meets the requirements of this Order and is accomplished personally and on a document-by-document basis by the agency head, the deputy agency head, the senior agency official designated under Section 5.3(a)(1),¹ or an official with original Top Secret classification authority.

PART 2

Derivative Classification

SEC. 2.1 Use of Derivative Classification.

(a) Derivative classification is (1) the determination that information is in substance the same as information currently classified, and (2) the application of the same classification markings. Persons who only reproduce, extract, or summarize classified information, or who only apply classification markings derived from source material or as directed by a classification guide, need not possess original classification authority.

(b) Persons who apply derivative classification markings shall:

- (1) observe and respect original classification decisions; and
- (2) carry forward to any newly created documents any assigned authorized markings. The declassification date or event that provides the longest period of classification shall be used for documents classified on the basis of multiple sources.

SEC. 2.2 Classification Guides.

(a) Agencies with original classification authority shall prepare classification guides to facilitate the proper and uniform derivative classification of information.

(b) Each guide shall be approved personally and in writing by an official who:

(1) has program or supervisory responsibility over the information or is the senior agency official designated under Section 5.3(a)(1);¹ and

(2) is authorized to classify information originally at the highest level of classification prescribed in the guide.

(c) Agency heads may, for good cause, grant and revoke waivers of the requirement to prepare classification guides for specified classes of documents or information. The Director of the Information Security Oversight Office shall be notified of any waivers.

PART 3

Declassification and Downgrading

SEC. 3.1 Declassification Authority.

(a) Information shall be declassified or downgraded as soon as national security considerations permit. Agencies shall coordinate their review of classified information with other agencies that have a direct interest in the subject matter. Information that continues to meet the

¹ EDITORIAL NOTE: The correct citation is Section 5.3(a).

² EDITORIAL NOTE: The correct citation is Section 5.3(a).

classification requirements prescribed by Section 1.3 despite the passage of time will continue to be protected in accordance with this Order.

(b) Information shall be declassified or downgraded by the official who authorized the original classification, if that official is still serving in the same position; the originator's successor; a supervisory official of either; or officials delegated such authority in writing by the agency head or the senior agency official designated pursuant to Section 5.3(a)(1).¹

(c) If the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office determines that information is classified in violation of this Order, the Director may require the information to be declassified by the agency that originated the classification. Any such decision by the Director may be appealed to the National Security Council. The information shall remain classified, pending a prompt decision on the appeal.

(d) The provisions of this Section shall also apply to agencies that, under the terms of this Order, do not have original classification authority, but that had such authority under predecessor orders.

SEC. 3.2 Transferred Information.

(a) In the case of classified information transferred in conjunction with a transfer of functions, and not merely for storage purposes, the receiving agency shall be deemed to be the originating agency for purposes of this Order.

(b) In the case of classified information that is not officially transferred as described in Section 3.2(a), but that originated in an agency that has ceased to exist and for which there is no successor agency, each agency in possession of such information shall be deemed to be the originating agency for purposes of this Order. Such information may be declassified or downgraded by the agency in possession after consultation with any other agency that has an interest in the subject matter of the information.

(c) Classified information accessioned into the National Archives of the United States shall be declassified or downgraded by the Archivist of the United States in accordance with this Order, the directives of the Information Security Oversight Office, and agency guidelines.

SEC. 3.3 Systematic Review for Declassification.

(a) The Archivist of the United States shall, in accordance with procedures and timeframes prescribed in the Information Security Oversight Office's directives implementing this Order, systematically review for declassification or downgrading (1) classified records accessioned into the National Archives of the United States, and (2) classified presidential papers or records under the Archivist's control. Such information shall be reviewed by the Archivist for declassification or downgrading in accordance with systematic review guidelines that shall be provided by the head of the agency that originated the information, or in the case of foreign government information, by the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office in consultation with interested agency heads.

(b) Agency heads may conduct internal systematic review programs for classified information originated by their agencies contained in

records determined by the Archivist to be permanently valuable but that have not been accessioned into the National Archives of the United States.

(c) After consultation with affected agencies, the Secretary of Defense may establish special procedures for systematic review for declassification of classified cryptologic information, and the Director of Central Intelligence may establish special procedures for systematic review for declassification of classified information pertaining to intelligence activities (including special activities), or intelligence sources or methods.

SEC. 3.4. Mandatory Review for Declassification.

(a) Except as provided in Section 3.4(b), all information classified under this Order or predecessor orders shall be subject to a review for declassification by the originating agency, if:

(1) the request is made by a United States citizen or permanent resident alien, a federal agency, or a State or local government; and

(2) the request describes the document or material containing the information with sufficient specificity to enable the agency to locate it with a reasonable amount of effort.

(b) Information originated by a President, the White House Staff, by committees, commissions, or boards appointed by the President, or others specifically providing advice and counsel to a President or acting on behalf of a President is exempted from the provisions of Section 3.4(a). The Archivist of the United States shall have the authority to review, downgrade and declassify information under the control of the Administrator of General Services or the Archivist pursuant to sections 2107, 2107 note, or 2203 of title 44, United States Code. Review procedures developed by the Archivist shall provide for consultation with agencies having primary subject matter interest and shall be consistent with the provisions of applicable laws or lawful agreements that pertain to the respective presidential papers or records. Any decision by the Archivist may be appealed to the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office. Agencies with primary subject matter interest shall be notified promptly of the Director's decision on such appeals and may further appeal to the National Security Council. The information shall remain classified pending a prompt decision on the appeal.

(c) Agencies conducting a mandatory review for declassification shall declassify information no longer requiring protection under this Order. They shall release this information unless withholding is otherwise authorized under applicable law.

(d) Agency heads shall develop procedures to process requests for the mandatory review of classified information. These procedures shall apply to information classified under this or predecessor orders. They shall also provide a means for administratively appealing a denial of a mandatory review request.

(e) The Secretary of Defense shall develop special procedures for the review of cryptologic information, and the Director of Central Intelligence shall develop special procedures for the review of information pertaining to intelligence activities (including special activities), or intelligence sources or methods, after consultation with affected agencies. The Archivist shall develop special procedures for the review of information accessioned into the National Archives of the United States.

¹ EDITORIAL NOTE: The correct citation is Section 5.3(a).

(f) In response to a request for information under the Freedom of Information Act, the Privacy Act of 1974, or the mandatory review provisions of this Order:

(1) An agency shall refuse to confirm or deny the existence or non-existence of requested information whenever the fact of its existence or non-existence is itself classifiable under this Order.

(2) When an agency receives any request for documents in its custody that were classified by another agency, it shall refer copies of the request and the requested documents to the originating agency for processing, and may, after consultation with the originating agency, inform the requester of the referral. In cases in which the originating agency determines in writing that a response under Section 3.4(f)(1) is required, the referring agency shall respond to the requester in accordance with that Section.

PART 4

Safeguarding

Sec. 4.1 General Restrictions on Access.

(a) A person is eligible for access to classified information provided that a determination of trustworthiness has been made by agency heads or designated officials and provided that such access is essential to the accomplishment of lawful and authorized Government purposes.

(b) Controls shall be established by each agency to ensure that classified information is used, processed, stored, reproduced, transmitted, and destroyed only under conditions that will provide adequate protection and prevent access by unauthorized persons.

(c) Classified information shall not be disseminated outside the executive branch except under conditions that ensure that the information will be given protection equivalent to that afforded within the executive branch.

(d) Except as provided by directives issued by the President through the National Security Council, classified information originating in one agency may not be disseminated outside any other agency to which it has been made available without the consent of the originating agency. For purposes of this Section, the Department of Defense shall be considered one agency.

Sec. 4.2 Special Access Programs.

(a) Agency heads designated pursuant to Section 1.2(a) may create special access programs to control access, distribution, and protection of particularly sensitive information classified pursuant to this Order or predecessor orders. Such programs may be created or continued only at the written direction of these agency heads. For special access programs pertaining to intelligence activities (including special activities but not including military operational, strategic and tactical programs), or intelligence sources or methods, this function will be exercised by the Director of Central Intelligence.

(b) Each agency head shall establish and maintain a system of accounting for special access programs. The Director of the Information Security Oversight Office, consistent with the provisions of Section 3.2(b)(4), shall have non-delegable access to all such accountings.

SEC. 4.3 Access by Historical Researchers and Former Presidential Appointees.

(a) The requirement in Section 4.1(a) that access to classified information may be granted only as is essential to the accomplishment of authorized and lawful Government purposes may be waived as provided in Section 4.3(b) for persons who:

(1) are engaged in historical research projects, or
 (2) previously have occupied policy-making positions to which they were appointed by the President.

(b) Waivers under Section 4.3(a) may be granted only if the originating agency:

(1) determines in writing that access is consistent with the interest of national security;

(2) takes appropriate steps to protect classified information from unauthorized disclosure or compromise, and ensures that the information is safeguarded in a manner consistent with this Order; and

(3) limits the access granted to former presidential appointees to items that the person originated, reviewed, signed, or received while serving as a presidential appointee.

PART 5

Implementation and Review

SEC. 5.1 Policy Direction.

(a) The National Security Council shall provide overall policy direction for the information security program.

(b) The Administrator of General Services shall be responsible for implementing and monitoring the program established pursuant to this Order. The Administrator shall delegate the implementation and monitoring functions of this program to the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office.

SEC. 5.2 Information Security Oversight Office.

(a) The Information Security Oversight Office shall have a full-time Director appointed by the Administrator of General Services subject to approval by the President. The Director shall have the authority to appoint a staff for the Office.

(b) The Director shall:

(1) develop, in consultation with the agencies, and promulgate, subject to the approval of the National Security Council, directives for the implementation of this Order, which shall be binding on the agencies;

(2) oversee agency actions to ensure compliance with this Order and implementing directives;

(3) review all agency implementing regulations and agency guidelines for systematic declassification review. The Director shall require any regulation or guideline to be changed if it is not consistent with this Order or implementing directives. Any such decision by the Director may be appealed to the National Security Council. The agency regulation or guideline shall remain in effect pending a prompt decision on the appeal;

(4) have the authority to conduct on-site reviews of the information security program of each agency that generates or handles classified information and to require of each agency those reports, information, and

other cooperation that may be necessary to fulfill the Director's responsibilities. If these reports, inspections, or access to specific categories of classified information would pose an exceptional national security risk, the affected agency head or the senior official designated under Section 5.3(a)(1) may deny access. The Director may appeal denials to the National Security Council. The denial of access shall remain in effect pending a prompt decision on the appeal;

(5) review requests for original classification authority from agencies or officials not granted original classification authority and, if deemed appropriate, recommend presidential approval;

(6) consider and take action on complaints and suggestions from persons within or outside the Government with respect to the administration of the information security program;

(7) have the authority to prescribe, after consultation with affected agencies, standard forms that will promote the implementation of the information security program;

(8) report at least annually to the President through the National Security Council on the implementation of this Order; and

(9) have the authority to convene and chair interagency meetings to discuss matters pertaining to the information security program.

SEC. 5.3 General Responsibilities.

Agencies that originate or handle classified information shall:

(a) designate a senior agency official to direct and administer its information security program, which shall include an active oversight and security education program to ensure effective implementation of this Order;

(b) promulgate implementing regulations. Any unclassified regulations that establish agency information security policy shall be published in the FEDERAL REGISTER to the extent that these regulations affect members of the public;

(c) establish procedures to prevent unnecessary access to classified information, including procedures that (i) require that a demonstrable need for access to classified information is established before initiating administrative clearance procedures, and (ii) ensure that the number of persons granted access to classified information is limited to the minimum consistent with operational and security requirements and needs; and

(d) develop special contingency plans for the protection of classified information used in or near hostile or potentially hostile areas.

SEC. 5.4 Sanctions.

(a) If the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office finds that a violation of this Order or its implementing directives may have occurred, the Director shall make a report to the head of the agency or to the senior official designated under Section 5.3(a)(1) so that corrective steps, if appropriate, may be taken.

(b) Officers and employees of the United States Government, and its contractors, licensees, and grantees shall be subject to appropriate sanctions if they:

(1) knowingly, willfully, or negligently disclose to unauthorized persons information properly classified under this Order or predecessor orders;

(2) knowingly and willfully classify or continue the classification of information in violation of this Order or any implementing directive; or

(3) knowingly and willfully violate any other provision of this Order or implementing directive.

(c) Sanctions may include reprimand, suspension without pay, removal, termination of classification authority, loss or denial of access to classified information, or other sanctions in accordance with applicable law and agency regulation.

(d) Each agency head or the senior official designated under Section 5.3(a)(1) shall ensure that appropriate and prompt corrective action taken whenever a violation under Section 5.4(b) occurs. Either shall ensure that the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office is promptly notified whenever a violation under Section 5.4(b) (1) or (2) occurs.

PART 6

General Provisions

SEC. 6.1 Definitions.

(a) "Agency" has the meaning provided at 5 U.S.C. 552(e).

(b) "Information" means any information or material, regardless of its physical form or characteristics, that is owned by, produced by or for, or is under the control of the United States Government.

(c) "National security information" means information that has been determined pursuant to this Order or any predecessor order to require protection against unauthorized disclosure and that is so designated.

(d) "Foreign government information" means:

(1) information provided by a foreign government or governments, an international organization of governments, or any element thereof with the expectation, expressed or implied, that the information, the source of the information, or both, are to be held in confidence; or

(2) information produced by the United States pursuant to or as a result of a joint arrangement with a foreign government or governments or an international organization of governments, or any element thereof, requiring that the information, the arrangement, or both, are to be held in confidence.

(e) "National security" means the national defense or foreign relations of the United States.

(f) "Confidential source" means any individual or organization that has provided, or that may reasonably be expected to provide, information to the United States on matters pertaining to the national security with the expectation, expressed or implied, that the information or relationship, or both, be held in confidence.

(g) "Original classification" means an initial determination that information requires, in the interest of national security, protection against unauthorized disclosure, together with a classification designation signifying the level of protection required.

¹ EDITORIAL NOTE: The correct citation is Section 5.3(a).

¹ EDITORIAL NOTE: The correct citation is Section 5.3(a).

Codification of Presidential Proclamations and Executive Orders

Sec. 62. General.

(a) Nothing in this Order shall supersede any requirement made by or under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. "Restricted Data" and "Formerly Restricted Data" shall be handled, protected, classified, declassified, and declassified in conformity with the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and regulations issued under that Act.

(b) The Attorney General, upon request by the head of an agency or the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office, shall render an interpretation of this Order with respect to any question arising in the course of its administration.

(c) Nothing in this Order limits the protection afforded any information by other provisions of law.

(d) Executive Order No. 12065 of June 28, 1978, as amended, is revoked as of the effective date of this Order.

(e) This Order shall become effective on August 1, 1982.

CHAPTER 33—NAVIGATION AND NAVIGABLE WATERS

Proclamations

3632 Regulations for preventing collisions at sea

Executive Orders

11177 Providing for certain arrangements under the Columbia River Treaty
11239 Enforcement of the Convention for Safety of Life at Sea, 1960
11574 Administration of the Refuse Act Permit Program
11964 Implementation of the Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1972
12234 Enforcement of the Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea

Proclamation 3632—Regulations for preventing collisions at sea

SOURCE: The provisions of Proclamation 3632 of Dec. 29, 1964, appear at 29 FR 19167, 3 CFR, 1964-1965 Comp., p. 73, unless otherwise noted.

WHEREAS certain regulations designated as Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1960, were approved by the International Conference on Safety of Life at Sea, 1960, held at London from May 17 to June 17, 1960; and

WHEREAS the Act of September 24, 1963 (Public Law 88-131, 77 Stat. 194), hereinafter referred to as the Act, authorizes the President of the United States of America to proclaim those regulations, which are set forth in Section 4 of the Act, and to specify the effective date thereof, the regulations to have effect (after the effective date thus specified), as if enacted by statute; and

WHEREAS on March 12, 1964, the Government of the United States of America communicated to the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization, as depository agency, its acceptance of the regulations; and

WHEREAS the Government of the United States of America has been notified by the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization, as depository agency, that substantial unanimity has been reached as to the acceptance by interested countries, and that it has

FE010-01

Peter

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**WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET**

- O - OUTGOING
- H - INTERNAL
- I - INCOMING

Date Correspondence Received (YY/MM/DD) 1 / 1

Name of Correspondent: Lee M. Graham

MI Mail Report User Codes: (A) _____ (B) _____ (C) _____

Subject: FOIA Request - Gordon Gray

ROUTE TO:

ACTION

DISPOSITION

Office/Agency (Staff Name)	Action Code	Tracking Date YY/MM/DD	Type of Response	Completion Date YY/MM/DD
<u>cu hold</u>	ORIGINATOR	<u>8710727</u>	<u>PY</u>	<u>C 871127</u>
	Referral Note:	<u>for JBS</u>		
<u>cuat 31</u>	<u>D</u>	<u>8710728</u>	<u>PY</u>	<u>C 871127</u>
	Referral Note:			
<u>cuat 29</u>	<u>S</u>	<u>871127</u>	<u>OS</u>	<u>A 871127</u>
	Referral Note:	<u>Nov. 27 1987 JBS memo to Gary Behrmit</u>		
	Referral Note:			
	Referral Note:			

ACTION CODES:

- A - Appropriate Action
- C - Comment/Recommendation
- D - Draft Response
- F - Furnish Fact Sheet to be used as Enclosure

- I - Info Copy Only/No Action Necessary
- R - Direct Reply w/Copy
- S - For Signature
- X - Interim Reply

DISPOSITION CODES:

- A - Answered
- B - Non-Special Referral
- C - Completed
- S - Suspended

FOR OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE:

- Type of Response = Initials of Signer
- Code = "A"
- Completion Date = Date of Outgoing

Comments: _____

Keep this worksheet attached to the original incoming letter.
Send all routing updates to Central Reference (Room 75, OEOB).
Always return completed correspondence record to Central Files.
Refer questions about the correspondence tracking system to Central Reference, ext. 2590.

RECORDS MANAGEMENT ONLY

CLASSIFICATION SECTION

No. of Additional Correspondents: _____ Media: L Individual Codes: 4000 _____

Prime Subject Code: FE 010-01 Secondary Subject Codes: _____

PRESIDENTIAL REPLY

Code	Date	Comment	Form
C	_____	Time: _____	P.
DSP	_____	Time: _____	Media: _____

SIGNATURE CODES:

- CPn - Presidential Correspondence**
- n - 0 - Unknown
- n - 1 - Ronald Wilson Reagan
- n - 2 - Ronald Reagan
- n - 3 - Ron
- n - 4 - Dutch
- n - 5 - Ron Reagan
- n - 6 - Ronald
- n - 7 - Ronnie

- CLn - First Lady's Correspondence**
- n - 0 - Unknown
- n - 1 - Nancy Reagan
- n - 2 - Nancy
- n - 3 - Mrs. Ronald Reagan

- CBn - Presidential & First Lady's Correspondence**
- n - 1 - Ronald Reagan - Nancy Reagan
- n - 2 - Ron - Nancy

MEDIA CODES:

- B - Box/package
- C - Copy
- D - Official document
- G - Message
- H - Handcarried
- L - Letter
- M - Mailgram
- O - Memo
- P - Photo
- R - Report
- S - Sealed
- T - Telegram
- V - Telephone
- X - Miscellaneous
- Y - Study

JBS/PDK:jck
JBStephens
PDKeisler
Chron.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

NOV 27 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR GARY SCHMITT
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD
ORIGINAL SIGNED BY J.B.S.

FROM: JAY B. STEPHENS
DEPUTY COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Freedom of Information Act Request by
Mr. Lee Graham

Attached for your information are copies of (1) a request we received under the Freedom of Information Act for records of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board; and (2) our response denying that request.

Attachments

517987CU

16 July 1987
Freedom of Information Act Request
(5 U.S.C. 552)
ANNE L. ARMSTRONG, Chairman
President's Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board
Old Executive Office Bldg.
Washington, DC
20500

Dear Ms. Armstrong:

This is a formal Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. 552) Request to your office (see enclosusre A) for the following records/documentation-

1. That record that defines the purpose/function of the "Psychological Strategy Board" on which Gordon Gray served (see enclosure B).
2. That record that defines Gordon Gray's function as a member of the "Psychological Strategy Board".
3. That record that defines the reason the "Psychological Strategy Board" was interested in "Flying Saucers" (see enclosure C).
4. That record that indicates the follow-on to the "Psychological Strategy Board".
5. That record that defines Gordon Gray's function as "a member of the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board" (see enclosure B).
6. That record that defines Gordon Gray's function as a member of the "Majestic-12 (Majic-12) Group" (see enclosure D-2) and the length of tenure as a member of this "Group".

Thank you for your time.

Sincerely


Lee M. Graham
526 W. Maple
Monrovia, CA
91016

JBS/PDK:jck
JBStephens
PDKeisler
Chron.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

NOV 27 1987

Dear Mr. Graham:

This letter responds to your Freedom of Information Act request to Anne Armstrong, Chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.

Please be advised that the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board is part of the White House Office. The White House Office is an entity whose "sole function is to advise and assist the President" and, as such, is not an "agency" subject to the Freedom of Information Act. Kissinger v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136, 156 (1980). Accordingly, we respectfully decline to comply with your request. You may wish to submit your request to other government agencies that are subject to the Freedom of Information Act.

Sincerely,
ORIGINAL SIGNED BY J.B.S.

Jay B. Stephens
Deputy Counsel to the President

Mr. Lee M. Graham
526 W. Maple
Monrovia, CA 91016

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 23, 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR JAY B. STEPHENS

FROM: PETER D. KEISLER *PK*

SUBJECT: Freedom of Information Act Request by
Mr. Lee M. Graham

The attached correspondence from Mr. Lee Graham is addressed to Anne Armstrong, Chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. Mr. Graham has requested certain PFIAB records under the Freedom of Information Act.

The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board was "established within the White House Office," Executive Order 12537, and consequently its records are not subject to the Freedom of Information Act. I have attached for your review and signature a letter of response so advising Mr. Graham.

I have also attached for your review and signature a draft memorandum to Gary Schmitt, Executive Director of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, transmitting for his information copies of Mr. Graham's request and our response.

By the way, if you have the time, you might want to glance through the documents that Mr. Graham has attached to his letter in order to explain his request. I do not know whether they are authentic, but they are certainly fascinating.

Attachments

51796 CU

16 July 1987
Freedom of Information Act Request
(5 U.S.C. 552)
ANNE L. ARMSTRONG, Chairman
President's Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board
Old Executive Office Bldg.
Washington, DC
20500

20
INTELLIGENCE
ADVISORY BOARD

Dear Ms. Armstrong:

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6. That record that defines Gordon Gray's function as a member of the "Majestic-12 (Majic-12) Group" (see enclosure D-2) and the length of tenure as a member of this "Group".

Thank you for your time.

Sincerely
Lee M. Graham
Lee M. Graham
526 W. Maple
Monrovia, CA
91016

Central Intelligence Agency, Langley, Va. (mailing address: Washington, D.C. 20505); 351-1100. William J. Casey, director. Information, 351-7676.

A part of the Executive Office. Coordinates the intelligence functions of government agencies as they relate to national security and advises the National Security Council on those functions; gathers and evaluates intelligence relating to national security and distributes the information to government agencies in the national security field.

Defense Dept., Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence, The Pentagon 20301; 695-0348. Donald C. Latham, assistant secretary.

Civilian office that advises and makes recommendations to the secretary of defense on the management of all Defense Dept. intelligence and communications programs, resources, and activities.

Defense Dept., Intelligence Oversight, The Pentagon 20301; 697-1346. Werner E. Michel, assistant to the secretary.

Responsible for the independent oversight of all Defense Dept. foreign intelligence and counter-intelligence activities; reviews intelligence operations and investigates and reports on possible violations of federal law or regulations.

Defense Intelligence Agency (Defense Dept.), The Pentagon 20301; 695-7353. Lt. Gen. James A. Williams (USA), director.

Gathers and evaluates military-related intelligence information to satisfy the requirements of the secretary of defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, selected components of the Defense Dept., and other authorized agencies. Monitors and reviews the operations of and develops guidelines for Defense Dept. intelligence functions.

Federal Bureau of Investigation (Justice Dept.), Intelligence Division, 10th St. and Pennsylvania Ave. N.W. 20535; 324-4880. Edward J. O'Malley, assistant director. Information, 324-5352.

Monitors and investigates foreign intelligence activities in the United States and coordinates similar activities carried out by other federal agencies.

National Security Agency (Defense Dept.), Fort Meade, Md. 20755; 688-6311. Lt. Gen. Lincoln D. Faurer (USAF), director. Information, 688-6524.

Assists the Defense Dept. in gathering national security information; maintains and operates

technical facilities designed to collect national security intelligence and protect communications security within the government.

National Security Council (Executive Office), The White House 20506; 456-2255. Robert C. McFarlane, assistant to the president for national security affairs. Information, 395-3044.

Advises the president on national security matters; collects information on national defense and coordinates the defense and intelligence functions of national security departments such as state and defense.

Navy Dept. (Defense Dept.), Naval Intelligence, The Pentagon 20350; 695-3944. Rear Adm. John L. Butts, director.

Military office that directs Navy intelligence activities and coordinates activities with other intelligence agencies.

President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (Executive Office), Old Executive Office Bldg. 20500; 456-2914. Anne L. Armstrong, chairman; Gary Schmitt, executive director.

Advises the president and makes recommendations to government intelligence agencies on the improvement of U.S. intelligence-gathering efforts. Assesses the quality, quantity, and adequacy of intelligence collection and analysis and of counterintelligence activities. Members appointed by the president.

President's Intelligence Oversight Board (Executive Office), Old Executive Office Bldg. 20500; 456-2530. W. Glenn Campbell, chairman; Bretton G. Sciaroni, counsel.

Advises the president on the legality and propriety of intelligence activities; receives reports from intelligence agencies. Also advises the attorney general on illegal intelligence activities.

Congress:

House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Procurement and Military Nuclear Systems, 2120 RHOB 20515; 225-7160. Samuel S. Stratton (D N.Y.), chairman; Adam Klein, counsel.

Jurisdiction over military intelligence activities affecting national security.

House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Security, and Science, 2103 RHOB 20515; 225-8926. Dante B. Fascell (D Fla.), chairman; Ivo Spalatin, staff director.

Oversight of foreign military intelligence.

House Governmental Operations and Security Subcommittee, B373 RHOB. Brooks (D Texas), staff director.

Oversight responsibilities related to the Defense Dept. armament agencies and Federal Emergency Management Agency.

House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, H405 CHOB. Hamilton (D Ind.), chairman; John R. Dingell (D Mich.), staff director.

Studies, makes recommendations on intelligence legislation on intelligence and policies; oversees the National Security Agency, National Intelligence Agency, and activities of the U.S. Intelligence Community with the U.S. authorizes budgets.

Senate Armed Services Committee, 20515; 224-3871. Chairman; James M. Inhofe (R Okla.), chairman; James M. Inhofe (R Okla.), chairman; James M. Inhofe (R Okla.), chairman. Jurisdiction over affecting national security.

Senate Governmental Operations and Security Committee, 340 20510; 244-Del., chairman; Oversees operations of the Intelligence Council.

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 211 20510; 224-Minn., chairman; Director.

Studies, makes recommendations on intelligence legislation on intelligence and policies; oversees the National Security Agency, National Intelligence Agency, and activities of the U.S. Intelligence Community with the U.S. authorizes budgets.

Non-governmental:

Center for National Security, Maryland Ave. N.W. H. Halperin, director. Sponsored by the American Civil Liberties Union and conducts research on national security, and intelligence activities of the Center.

Gordon Gray, Former Secretary Of U.S. Army, Dies at Age 73

By J. Y. Smith
Washington Post Staff Writer

Gordon Gray, 73, the national security adviser to President Dwight D. Eisenhower from 1958 to 1961 and a former secretary of the Army and president of the University of North Carolina, died of cancer yesterday at his home in Washington.

Mr. Gray was born to wealth, educated in a classic mold, trained for the law and given to business. Although he kept up his business interests throughout his life, much of his career was devoted to public service. It was often observed of him that in seven years he went from the rank of private in the Army to secretary of the Army. It also was widely noted that he was guided by neither fear nor favor in his dealings in government.

The most visible posts he held were quintessentially involved with national security. But he gave many years to other aspects of government, including the affairs of Washington. From 1962 to 1973, he was president of the National Trust for Historic Preservation. In 1966, he played a role in the passage of the Historic Preservation Act. In 1962 and 1968, he was president of the Federal City Council.

In accepting that post, he said the council should work for broad national support for a larger federal payment to Washington for municipal services. He also said the council should assign "top-priority rating to working for cultural and esthetic objectives in the nation's capital."

Mr. Gray was born in Baltimore. His father, a president and chairman of the R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., moved the family to Winston-Salem, N.C. The young Gray graduated from the University of North Carolina, where he was elected to Phi Beta Kappa, and Yale Law School, where he was an editor of the Law Journal and a member of the Coif.

He practiced law in New York and then in Winston-Salem. In 1938, he acquired control of the Piedmont Publishing Co., publishers of The Winston-Salem Journal and the Twin City Sentinel. He also was elected to the North Carolina state senate.

In World War II, he declined a commission in the Army and en-

listed as a private. He eventually became a captain in military intelligence with the 12th Army Group of Gen. Omar N. Bradley in Europe.

In 1947, he was named assistant secretary of the Army by President Harry S. Truman. In 1949, after a period as undersecretary, he was promoted to secretary.

In 1950, he was appointed president of the University of North Carolina. While holding that office, he carried out a number of tasks for the White House, including a report on foreign economic policy. In 1951, he was made the first director of the Psychological Strategy Board.

In 1954, he chaired a Personnel Security Board that recommended that the Atomic Energy Commission remove the security clearance of J. Robert Oppenheimer, the noted physicist who played a major role in the development of the atomic bomb in World War II. Mr. Gray said that while Oppenheimer undoubtedly was a loyal citizen he had violated the AEC's security procedures. This action was in keeping with the security concerns of those times. But many who opposed the strident anti-communism exemplified by the late Sen. Joseph R. McCarthy (R-Wis.) were harshly critical of the action.

In 1955, Mr. Gray resigned from the University of North Carolina to become assistant secretary of Defense for international security affairs. He later was director of the Office of Defense Mobilization. Eisenhower appointed him national security adviser in 1958 and he continued in that job until the inauguration of President John F. Kennedy on Jan. 20, 1961.

Mr. Gray then returned to his business interests. He was president of Piedmont Publishing until 1969, when the company became Summit Communications. The firm operates broadcast properties and cable television systems and Mr. Gray was its chairman until his death. He was a director of R. J. Reynolds Industries, Media General Inc. and the American Security & Trust Co. He also was the president of Kensington Orchids, a large supplier of orchids to the Washington market.

Mr. Gray was a member of the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board from 1961 to 1976. He was a trustee



GORDON GRAY

of the Brookings Institution and chairman of the Corcoran Gallery of Art in Washington and the Research Triangle Foundation in North Carolina.

His first wife, the former Jane Henderson Boyden Craige, died in 1953.

Survivors include his wife, Nancy of Washington; four sons by his first marriage, Gordon Jr. of New York City, Burton Craige of McLean, C. Boyden of Washington, and Bernard of Winston-Salem; two stepdaughters, Alexandra Beebe Wright of Winston-Salem, and Schuyler Beebe of Washington, and four grandchildren.

In Memoriams	Death
<p>COLLIERS, JOHN B. ("Foe") Fond memories of my husband on the 19th year in Heaven. November 27, 1982. Honey, how I miss you can't be said in a line or two. Each day a thousand things remind me of the love I shared with you. Rest in peace. Love you HONEY.</p>	<p>COLE, JANET MAC On Thursday, Nov. 25, 1982, at her home in Boonton, N.J., wife of Brig. Gen. John Cole, USA, mother of Cole, Mr. Leann, Cole, Gastroline, B. Ohio, N.J., brother Kay, and five Services Arlington, Va. Tuesday, Nov. 27, 1982. Contributions made to the Equitrian Team 07934.</p>
<p>EURE, MARY S. EURE, JOSEPH S. In memory of our mother, MARY S. EURE, who passed away November 15, 1955 and our father, JOSEPH S. EURE, November 27, 1943. November comes with sad regrets. It brings back a day we will never forget. Though gone from us, you are always near. Still loved still missed and very near. Children: BLANCHE LEWIS, ETHELORA PARRIN, ROSELLA GREEN, EARNEST EURE and GRANDCHILDREN</p>	<p>COLEY, DAVID E. On Tuesday, Nov. 23, 1982, at his residence, DAVID E. COLEY, beloved son, brother of Cornelia Thomas, Mings and Claude also survived by a relative and friend. 7 p.m. Sunday. Friends may call BROS. FUNERAL HOME, Florida ave. n.w. Services will be held November 29, at 11 Washington Nat'l.</p>
<p>PEARSON, HOWARD D. A tribute of love and devotion is offered to the memory of our beloved one HOWARD who departed this life six years ago, November 27, 1976. Lived a life for all the better things he did for us.</p>	<p>DAVENPORT, THE On Wednesday, Nov. 24, 1982, at her residence, after a long illness, DAVENPORT, Mrs. Walter E. senior, Carter, Franklin, Melvin Davenport, New York, Wash. D.C. and other relatives.</p>



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~Security Information~~
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

1952?
TABS NOT FOUND

Declassified by 058575
date 20 APR 1977

MEMORANDUM TO: **Director, Psychological Strategy Board**

SUBJECT: Flying Saucers

1. I am today transmitting to the National Security Council a proposal (TAB A) in which it is concluded that the problems connected with unidentified flying objects appear to have implications for psychological warfare as well as for intelligence and operations.

2. The background for this view is presented in some detail in TAB B.

3. I suggest that we discuss at an early board meeting the possible offensive or defensive utilization of these phenomena for psychological warfare purposes.

Enclosure

Walter B. Smith
Director

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~~TOP SECRET~~ 110

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY

* TOP SECRET *

EYES ONLY

COPY ONE OF ONE.

BRIEFING DOCUMENT: OPERATION MAJESTIC 12

PREPARED FOR PRESIDENT-ELECT DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER: (EYES ONLY)

18 NOVEMBER, 1952

WARNING: This is a ~~TOP SECRET~~ document containing compartmentalized information essential to the national security of the United States. ~~EYES ONLY~~ the material herein is strictly limited to those possessing Majestic-12 clearance level. Reproduction in any form or the taking of written or mechanically transcribed notes is strictly forbidden.

T52-EXEMPT (E)

~~TOP SECRET~~

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COPY ONE OF ONE.

SUBJECT: OPERATION MAJESTIC-12 PRELIMINARY BRIEFING FOR
PRESIDENT-ELECT EISENHOWER.

DOCUMENT PREPARED 18 NOVEMBER, 1952.

BRIEFING OFFICER: ADM. ROSCOE H. HILLENKOETTER (MJ-1)

NOTE: This document has been prepared as a preliminary briefing only. It should be regarded as introductory to a full operations briefing intended to follow.

OPERATION MAJESTIC-12 is a TOP SECRET Research and Development/Intelligence operation responsible directly and only to the President of the United States. Operations of the project are carried out under control of the Majestic-12 (Majic-12) Group which was established by special classified executive order of President Truman on 24 September, 1947, upon recommendation by Dr. Vannevar Bush and Secretary James Forrestal. (See Attachment "A"). Members of the Majestic-12 Group were designated as follows:

- Adm. Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter
- Dr. Vannevar Bush
- Secy. James V. Forrestal*
- Gen. Nathan F. Twining
- Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg
- Dr. Detlev Bronk
- Dr. Jerome Hunsaker
- Mr. Sidney W. Souers
- Mr. Gordon Gray
- Dr. Donald Hensel
- Gen. Robert H. Montague
- Dr. Lloyd V. Berkner

The death of Secretary Forrestal on 22 May, 1949, created a vacancy which remained unfilled until 01 August, 1950, upon which date Gen. Walter B. Smith was designated as permanent replacement.

* MOD SPORER *

~~EYES ONLY~~

COPY ONE OF ONE.

On 24 June, 1947, a civilian pilot flying over the Cascade Mountains in the State of Washington observed nine flying disc-shaped aircraft traveling in formation at a high rate of speed. Although this was not the first known sighting of such objects, it was the first to gain widespread attention in the public media. Hundreds of reports of sightings of similar objects followed. Many of these came from highly credible military and civilian sources. These reports resulted in independent efforts by several different elements of the military to ascertain the nature and purpose of these objects in the interests of national defense. A number of witnesses were interviewed and there were several unsuccessful attempts to utilize aircraft in efforts to pursue reported discs in flight. Public reaction bordered on near hysteria at times.

In spite of these efforts, little of substance was learned about the objects until a local rancher reported that one had crashed in a remote region of New Mexico located approximately seventy-five miles northwest of Roswell Army Air Base (now Walker Field).

On 07 July, 1947, a secret operation was begun to assure recovery of the wreckage of this object for scientific study. During the course of this operation, aerial reconnaissance discovered that four small human-like beings had apparently ejected from the craft at some point before it exploded. These had fallen to earth about two miles east of the wreckage site. All four were dead and badly decomposed due to action by predators and exposure to the elements during the approximately one week time period which had elapsed before their discovery. A special scientific team took charge of removing these bodies for study. (See Attachment "C".) The wreckage of the craft was also removed to several different locations. (See Attachment "B".) Civilian and military witnesses in the area were debriefed, and news reporters were given the effective cover story that the object had been a misguided weather research balloon.

T52-EXEMPT (B)

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COPY ONE OF ONE.

A covert analytical effort organized by Gen. Twining and Dr. Rush acting on the direct orders of the President, resulted in a preliminary concensus (19 September, 1947) that the disc was most likely a short range reconnaissance craft. This conclusion was based for the most part on the craft's size and the apparent lack of any identifiable provisioning. (See Attachment "D".) A similar analysis of the four dead occupants was arranged by Dr. Bronk. It was the tentative conclusion of this group (30 November, 1947) that although these creatures are human-like in appearance, the biological and evolutionary processes responsible for their development has apparently been quite different from those observed or postulated in homo-sapiens. Dr. Bronk's team has suggested the term "Extra-terrestrial Biological Entities", or "EREs", be adopted as the standard term of reference for these creatures until such time as a more definitive designation can be agreed upon.

Since it is virtually certain that these craft do not originate in any country on earth, considerable speculation has centered around what their point of origin might be and how they get here. Mars was and remains a possibility, although some scientists, most notably Dr. Menzel, consider it more likely that we are dealing with beings from another solar system entirely.

Numerous examples of what appear to be a form of writing were found in the wreckage. Efforts to decipher these have remained largely unsuccessful. (See Attachment "E".) Equally unsuccessful have been efforts to determine the method of propulsion or the nature or method of transmission of the power source involved. Research along these lines has been complicated by the complete absence of identifiable wings, propellers, jets, or other conventional methods of propulsion and guidance, as well as a total lack of metallic wiring, vacuum tubes, or similar recognizable electronic components. (See Attachment "F".) It is assumed that the propulsion unit was completely destroyed by the explosion which caused the crash.

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A need for as much additional information as possible about these craft, their performance characteristics and their purpose led to the undertaking known as U.S. Air Force Project SIGN in December, 1947. In order to preserve security, liason between SIGN and Majestic-12 was limited to two individuals within the Intelligence Division of Air Materiel Command whose role was to pass along certain types of information through channels. SIGN evolved into Project GRUDGE in December, 1948. The operation is currently being conducted under the code name BLUE BOOK, with liason maintained through the Air Force officer who is head of the project.

On 06 December, 1950, a second object, probably of similar origin, impacted the earth at high speed in the El Indio - Guerrero area of the Texas - Mexican border after following a long trajectory through the atmosphere. By the time a search team arrived, what remained of the object had been almost totally incinerated. Such material as could be recovered was transported to the A.E.C. facility at Sandia, New Mexico, for study.

Implications for the National Security are of continuing importance in that the motives and ultimate intentions of these visitors remain completely unknown. In addition, a significant upsurge in the surveillance activity of these craft beginning in May and continuing through the autumn of this year has caused considerable concern that new developments may be imminent. It is for these reasons, as well as the obvious international and technological considerations and the ultimate need to avoid a public panic at all costs, that the Majestic-12 Group remains of the unanimous opinion that imposition of the strictest security precautions should continue without interruption into the new administration. At the same time, contingency plan MJ-1949-04P/78 (Top Secret - Eyes Only) should be held in continued readiness should the need to make a public announcement present itself. (See Attachment "G".)

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ENUMERATION OF ATTACHMENTS:

- *ATTACHMENT "A".....Special Classified Executive Order #092447. (TS/EO)
- *ATTACHMENT "B".....Operation Majestic-12 Status Report #1, Part A. 30 NOV '47. (TS-MAJIC/EO)
- *ATTACHMENT "C".....Operation Majestic-12 Status Report #1, Part B. 30 NOV '47. (TS-MAJIC/EO)
- *ATTACHMENT "D".....Operation Majestic-12 Preliminary Analytical Report. 19 SEP '47. (TS-MAJIC/EO)
- *ATTACHMENT "E".....Operation Majestic-12 Blue Team Report #5. 30 JUN '52. (TS-MAJIC/EO)
- *ATTACHMENT "F".....Operation Majestic-12 Status Report #2. 31 JAN '48. (TS-MAJIC/EO)
- *ATTACHMENT "G".....Operation Majestic-12 Contingency Plan MJ-1949-04P/78: 31 JAN '49. (TS-MAJIC/EO)
- *ATTACHMENT "H".....Operation Majestic-12, Maps and Photographs Folio (Extractions). (TS-MAJIC/EO)

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- ATTACHMENT "A"

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T52-EXEMPT (B)

~~TOP SECRET~~
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON


September 24, 1947.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Dear Secretary Forrestal:

As per our recent conversation on this matter, you are hereby authorized to proceed with all due speed and caution upon your undertaking. Hereafter this matter shall be referred to only as Operation Majestic Twelve.

It continues to be my feeling that any future considerations relative to the ultimate disposition of this matter should rest solely with the Office of the President following appropriate discussions with yourself, Dr. Bush and the Director of Central Intelligence.



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~~TOP SECRET~~
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